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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Richard W. Garnett*
There is-no surprise! -nothing doctrinaire, rigid, or for-
mulaic about Kent Greenawalt's study of the establishment
clause. He works with principles and values, not "rules" or
"tests" (although he finds more to admire in the "Lemon test"
than many courts and commentators do1). In Establishment and
Fairness, the discussion and analysis are almost always highly
sensitive to context, the conclusions almost always fact-bound.
There is, throughout the project, a consistent openness to the
possibility-indeed, to the likelihood-that different circum-
stances will call for different results His approach, he says, is a
"sensible, nuanced" one, which "involves a number of debatable
choices and does not reduce to any simple formula" (p. 433). In
his view, the way to understand how the Constitution's religion
clauses "should best be understood" is not by asking questions
"in the abstract but by focusing on concrete issues in context" (p.
543).
Clearly, this wonderful book is a great achievement. It is
impossible not to admire the reasonableness, humility, and char-
ity that characterizes and animates this work, and Greenawalt's
entire scholarly career. That said, one has to ask: Is Greenawalt's
reluctance, in the establishment clause context, to settle on
bright-line rules a "good thing" or a "bad thing"? Is his "sensi-
ble, nuanced approach" the right one, or even an attractive one?
And if it is-if Greenawalt's approach to establishment-and-
fairness questions, his appreciation for the values that are at
stake in the relevant cases, and his sense that the relevant princi-
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. See, e.g., p. 52 ("I ... contend that what the Court has done in respect to estab-
lishment is, overall, more cohesive and reasonable than many scholars of the religion
clauses believe."). See generally pp. 157-80 (examining the Lemon test).
2. See, e.g., p. 195 (noting that "conditions of scarcity" with respect to public facili-
ties "could vary [the] conclusion" that, as a general matter, "[t]here is no reason to make
public facilities available only for religious groups").
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ples are basically sound-then what are the implications of his
approach for the challenge of finding and implementing the es-
tablishment clause's judicially enforceable content? "It is,"
Greenawalt insists, "in the nature of fundamental constitutional
principles that their full content is never settled once and for all"
(p. 543). Perhaps. We do, however, routinely ask judges to iden-
tify and "settle"-at least for the time-being-the implications of
such "principles" in the context of real-world lawsuits. Should
we?
Early in the book, Greenawalt addresses various forms of
"skepticism" about "tests for the Establishment Clause," includ-
ing the view that "the clauses reflect such complex, often con-
flicting, values, that no tests can do them justice" (pp. 51, 52). In
my view, this "skepticism" is well founded, and Greenawalt does
not dismiss it.3 The truth in these doubts should give us some
pause: What, exactly, and with what justification are judges de-
ciding establishment clause cases doing when they invalidate or
approve the actions of governments and officials in the name of
"complex, often conflictin~g values"? Even if "the rule of law" is
not only a "law of rules," is it troubling to think that resolving
disputes about matters so important and basic as the place of re-
ligion in public life, and the connections and boundaries between
religious and political authorities, depends on the deployment of
imperfect, incomplete doctrine by judges who will not always be
as learned and sensible to "complex, often conflicting values" as
is Kent Greenawalt? If deciding establishment-and-fairness cases
involves-if it inescapably involves-questions like "whether in-
stituting a moment of silence will significantly endorse prayer
and will have a detrimental effect on those of minority faiths and
nonbelievers" (p. 118) (emphasis in original); if "[j]udges review-
ing school efforts to teach about religion face hard questions
about supervision and control" (p. 135); if "judicial determina-
tions of improper purpose" are inevitably attended by "various
subtleties" (p. 163); if these cases necessarily present (to a
greater extent than every interesting legal question does) ques-
tions of degree, balancing, trade-offs, and multiple values, then
why should we believe that they are best, or even better, re-
3. P. 52 ("Justices can resolve [establishment clause] cases.., according to some
coherent pattern, but whether that pattern can be verbalized into a coherent set of tests
and standards is debatable. ... These are serious obstacles, but one needs a closer
look... before admitting defeat.").
4. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
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solved by judges through litigation than by citizens, officials, and
legislators through politics?
These and similar questions could reflect (at least) two, re-
lated concerns: First, we might think that judges are neither bet-
ter equipped nor more likely than are politically accountable ac-
tors to identify the outcome that best respects the "complex,
often competing" values that are in play in establishment clause
cases. In addition, we might suspect-even if we do believe that
courts are the institutions to which these disputes should be en-
trusted-that "judicially manageable standards" are not avail-
able These and similar worries could, in turn, convince us to
treat (for the most part) the establishment clause as stating, in
Thayer's words, a "maxim[] of political morality, 6 for general
consideration rather than as promulgating a prohibition that can,
or should, be enforced to the full extent of its meaning by judges.
We might even say not only that judges should be deferential-
applying a "rule of the clear mistake" -when evaluating legisla-
tive action in light of the establishment clause, but that they
should settle for constructing and enforcing only those clear and
straightforwardly administrable rules that are essential to vindi-
cating the clause's core, clear meaning and guarantees.8 On this
view, they should, for example, give up on identifying the dusk-
twilight point at which permissible recognition or accommoda-
tion of religion becomes impermissible endorsement or privileg-
ing, and focus instead on vindicating the self-government rights
of religious institutions.'
5. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Con-
stitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006).
6. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130 (1893). For a recent and engaging defense of a
Thayerian approach to disputes regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty,
abortion restrictins, and refusals to recognize same-sex unions, see MICHAEL J. PERRY,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009).
7. See Michael J. Perry, ts Capital Punishment Unconstitutional? And Even if We
Think it Is, Should We Want the Supreme Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV. 867 (2007)
(discussing Thayer and Bickel).
8. There is a rich and growing literature suggesting a distinction, and a gap, be-
tween the Constitution's meaning and judicially crafted implementing doctrines. See gen-
erally, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004);
Fallon, supra note 5; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underen-
forced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
9. I have argued elsewhere for the centrality of "church autonomy" and the relig-
ion-protecting distinction between the institutions and authorities of religion, on the one
hand, and those of the state, on the other. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Free-
dom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007).
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Greenawalt repeatedly acknowledges questions like the
ones raised above. He engages, for example, Steve Smith's ar-
guments concerning the "impossibility of the court's developing
adequate legal principles regarding religious freedom" and his
suggestion that we "should ask ourselves whether the courts
might profitably play less of a role than they do in circumscribing
church-state relations" (p. 438). He recognizes that "[o]ne might
believe that a fair amount of legislation enforcing morality vio-
lates the Establishment Clause, but not in a way a court can de-
clare" (p. 498). In his chapter on "legal enforcement of religion-
based morality," he concedes that, given all the givens, his ap-
proach "will rarely, if ever, lead a court to invalidate a law" (p.
536). And so one might wonder why the conclusion of, or "take-
away" from, Greenawalt's context-sensitive approach to church-
and-state and religion-and-public life questions isn't something
like this: "These questions are hard, answering them requires
balancing and trade-offs, there are many values at stake, and
sometimes in tension, and so the best way to answer these ques-
tions-with a few exceptions-is through politics." To say this is
not, of course, to pretend that there is not a lot at stake, or that
the right answers do not matter (just because they are hard to
find). It is simply to confess that, in this area, "judicially man-
ageable standards" are hard to come by, that the arena of poli-
tics is one where "complex, often conflicting values" are often
balanced, and so, perhaps, we should admit a possible, "permis-
sible disparity between constitutional ideals and [judicially en-
forceable] implementing doctrine."'
But couldn't we-after taking to heart Greenawalt's appre-
ciation for conflicting values and his sensitivity to context-just
as well opt for "overenforcement" as "underenforcement" of the
establishment clause?11 Not, I think, just as well.
Three years ago, Jeremy Waldron set out the "core of the
case against judicial review."' 2 In his essay, he suggested that
"rights-based judicial review is inappropriate for reasonably de-
mocratic societies whose main problem is not that their legisla-
tive institutions are dysfunctional but that their members dis-
10. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1332.
11. Professor Fallon compares, for example, Henry Monaghan's identification of
overenforcing rules with Lawrence Sager's focus on judicial tests that underenforce con-
stitutional norms. Id. at 1297-1306.
12. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006).
GREENA WALT ESSAYS
agree about rights.' 3 This is because (to oversimplify) there is
no reason to believe that courts (or renowned and context-
sensitive law professors) are more likely to better protect rights
than are democratic legislatures and, in addition, judicial review
is undemocratic. I am sympathetic to Waldron's suggestion,
though it goes farther than I mean or need to go here. Here, the
suggestion is simply that the journey with Kent Greenawalt
through two volumes and a thousand pages of careful, charitable
balancing might lead us to think that the better course is to find
(somehow) some bright-line, on-off "rules" and "tests", con-
structed to identify and forbid the most obvious violations of the
Religion Clauses' core-Murder in the Cathedral'4-type viola-
tions-and give up on (or, perhaps, "underenforce") the rest.
13. Id. at 1406.
14. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL (1935).
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